A discussion of access to credit in South Africa with specific reference to reckless lending and over-indebted consumers. by Botha, Louise Grace.
 
 
A discussion of access to credit in South Africa with specific 




Louise Grace Botha 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
 




UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL 
 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Bibliography          i 
Declaration           vi 
Table of Abbreviations         vii 
Abstract           viii 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background          1 
1.2 Problem Statement         2 
1.3 Research Questions         5 
1.4 Research Methodology         6 
1.5 Overview of Chapters         6 
 
CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 The importance of access to credit.       7 
2.2 Credit Legislation prior to the National Credit Act.     9 
2.2.1 The Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980      9 
2.2.2 The Usury Act 73 of 1968        10 
2.2.3 The Exemption Notice         11 
2.3 Debt relief measures prior to the National Credit Act.     14 
2.3.1 Insolvency.          14 
2.3.2 Administration.          18 
2.3.3 Emolument Attachment Orders.       20 







CHAPTER 3 THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 
3.1 Rationale for the introduction of the National Credit Act.               26 
3.2 The Purpose of the National Credit Act.       27 
3.3 Important sections of the National Credit Act.      28 
3.3.1 Over-indebtedness.         29 
3.3.2 Reckless lending provisions.        29 
3.3.3 Debt review.          35 
3.4 Enforcement of the National Credit Act       38 
3.4.1 National Credit Regulator        38 
3.4.2 National Consumer Tribunal        41 
3.5 Concluding remarks.         42 
 
Chapter 4 The National Credit Amendment Act 
4.1 Rationale for the amendment.        45 
4.2 Important provisions of the National Credit Amendment Act.    46 
4.2.1 Registration of credit providers.       46 
4.2.2 Affordability Assessments.        47 
4.2.3 The NCT to deal with reckless credit lending.      49 
4.2.4 Amendment of Section 136 of the NCA.      50 
4.3 Concluding remarks.         50 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 







Anon ‘Amendments to the National Credit Act will help many South Africans settle their   
debt’ (available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/News/NewsArticlesandPressmediareleases/tabid/4674/language/en-
US/Default.aspx). 
Anon ‘National Credit Act, no 34 of 2005 – Submissions: National Credit Act Amendment 
Bill’(02 December 2013) Microfinance South Africa (available at 
http://www.mfsa.net/new/sites/default/files/MFSA%20Submission_National%20Credit%20A
ct%20Amendment%20Bill%202%20Dec%202013.pdf). 
Anon ‘National Credit Act – Recent amendments are about much morethan just a credit 
information Amnesty’(2014) (available at http://www.stbb.co.za/uploads/stbb_lu4-
2014_s2.pdf) 
Anon ‘National Credit Amendment Bill: briefing by Department of Trade and Industry’ 
(2013) (available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140228-national-credit-amendment-bill-
b47b-2013-briefing-department-trade-and-industry). 
Anon ‘Çonsumers struggle out of debt trap’(06 August 2012) Business Day (available at 
www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2009/10/23/consumers-struggle-out-of-debt-trap). 
Anon ‘Government moves to protect consumers and assist over-indebted households’(12 
December 2013) (available at www.dti.gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=2964). 
Anon ‘Making Credit Markets Work, A policy framework for consumer credit’ (available at 
www.ncr.orf.za/publications/Background_NCA_docs/Credit Law Review.pdf). 
Anon ‘Marikana Massacre’ (16 August 2012) (available at 
www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-August-2012). 
Anon ‘Voluntary Sequestration – Advantages and Disadvantages’ (20 October 
2014)(available at www.insolvencycare.co.za). 
Arde, A ‘What to know before you borrow’ (29 July 2012) IOL (available at 
www.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/what-to-know-before-you-borrow-
1.1350997#.VDzMf7DlfKO). 
Arde, A ‘Ministers’wish list to end debt abuse’(15 December 2013) IOL (available at 
http:www.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/ministers-wish-list-to-end-debt-abuse-
1.1622424#VHWlcouUfUU). 
Asheela, N ‘The Advantage Requirement in Sequestration Applications: A call for relaxation’ 
(7 September 2013)(available at www.upetd.ac.za).  
Batemen, M ‘The rise and fall of microcredit in post-apartheid South Africa’ (November 
2012) (available at mondediplo.com/blogs/the-rise-and-fall-of-microcredit-in-post).  
Bentley, B ‘Separating the baby and the bath water – garnishee and emoluments attachement 




Bester, L ‘Lifeline for over-indebtedness’ (17 May 2013) Fin24 (available at 
www.fin24.com/Debt/News/Lifeline-for-over-indebtedness-20130515). 
Boraine, A and Van Heerden, C ‘The application of the National Credit Act on sequestration 
applications’(available at https://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/Law Clinic Draft Papers 
from Conference/Andre Boraine en Corlia Van Heerden Draft.pdf). 
Boraine, A and Van Heerden, C ‘To sequestrate or not to sequestrate in view of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005: A tale of two judgements’2010 (3) PER/PELJ 3. 
Bronkhorst, Q ‘The inside story of the R699 car scheme’ (9 July 2014) Businesstech 
(available at www.businesstech.co.za/new/general/62203/the-inside-story-of-the-R699-car-
scheme). 
Buthelezi, L ‘Banks want crdit data of former defaulters to stay’ (30 January 2014) IOL 
(available at www.iol.co.za/business/news/banks-want-credit-data-of-former-defaulters-to-
stay-1.1639068#VDxl2rDlfKO). 
Du Preez, Laura ‘Debtors pay millions in illegal fees’ (available at 
www.debtbusters.co.za/article/debtors-pay-millions-in-illegal-fees/). 
Ensor, L ‘Changes to the National Credit Act in the pipeline’ (4 February 2013) Business 
Day Live (available at www.bdlive.co.za/business/retail/2013/02/04/changes-to-national-
credit-act-in-pipeline). 
Ensor, L ‘Wonga CEO says new credit laws hit online lenders’ (4 February 2014) Business 
Day Live (available at www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2014/02/04/wonga-ceo-says-
new-credit-law-will-hit-online-lenders). 
Fischer-French, M ‘Reckless lending charges are no deterrent” (18 March 2013) (available at 
http://mayaonmoney.co.za/2013/03/reckless-lending-no-deterrent-2/). 
Kelly Louw, M Á creit provider’s complete defence against a consumer’s allegation of 
reckless lending’ (available at 
reference.sabinet.co.za.exproxy.ukzn.ac.za:2048/webx/access/electronic_journals/ju_samlj_v
26_n1_a2.pdf).  
Kelly Louw, M ‘Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa’ 2012. 
Kelly Louw, M ‘The prevention and alleviation of consumer over-indebtedness’ 20 SA Merc 
LJ 200. 
Kirsten, M ‘Policy initiatives to expand financial outreach in South Africa’ (Discussion paper 
delivered at World Bank/Brookings Institute Conference 30 and 31 May 2006) (available at 
www.dbsa.org/en/About-Us/Publications/Documents/Policy). 
Knowler, W ‘The R699 car story keeps accelerating…’ (10 July 2014) (available at 
www.ecr.co.za/post/the-r699-car-story-keeps-accelerating). 
Kreuser, M ‘The application of section 85 of the National Credit Act in an application for 





Mhlanga, D ‘Jobless consumers over-indebted’ (19 February 2013) (available at 
www.property24.com/articles/jobless-consumers-over-indebted). 
Omarjee, L ‘R699 car drivers moving forward’(13 July 2014) (available at 
www.fin24.com/Companies/Advertising/R699-car-drivers-moving-forward-20140713). 
Renke, S, Roestaff, M & Haupt, F ‘The National Credit Act: new parameters for granting of 
credit in South Africa’ (2007) Obiter 245 (available at 
http://www.journals.co.za/ej/ejour_obiter.hml).  
Slabbert, A ‘Five million South Africans drowning in debt’(05 November 2013) Moneyweb 
(available at http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-economic-trends/five-million-south-
africans-drowning-in-debt). 
Steyn, L ‘African Bank to pay R20m after reaching NCR agreement’ (04 October 2013) Mail 
and Gaurdian Online (available at mg.co.za/article/2013-10-04-credit-regulator-agreement-
african-bank-to-pay-over-r20m). 
Steyn, L ‘Marikana miners in debt sinkhole’ (07 September 2012) Mail and Gaurdian Online 
(available at mg.co.za/article/2012-09-07-00-marikana-miners-in-debt-sinkhole) 
Stoop, P ‘South African consumer credit policy: measures indirectly aimed at preventing 
consumer over-indebtedness’(2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 365-386. 
Thomas, S ‘Cover Story 1 – Consumer Debt’ (2 April 2012) Financial Mail (available at 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/fm/2011/10/27/cover-story-1---consumer-debt)  
University of Pretoria Law Clinic ‘The incidence and undesirable practises relating to 
garnishee orders – a follow up report’ (September 2013) (available at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%20up%20r
eport.pdf). 
Veeragudu, T ‘Scrapping your credit agreement’ (19 July 2010) (available at 
http://www.lucidliving.co.za/legal/354). 
Vessio, M ‘What does the National Credit Regulator Regulate?’(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 227-
242. 
Woker, T ‘Access to redress for consumers: rights without redress are meaningless rights’ 
(Discussion paper presented at the International Consumer Law Conference) Pretoria 
(September 2014). 
 
Law Commission Papers 
South African Law Reform Commission ‘Questionaire on abolition of administration 







Table of Statutes 
Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
s 6(a) 
 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1963 
 s 6 
 s 8 
 s 9(1) 
 s 12(1) 
 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
 s 3 
 s 12 
 s 13 
 s 14 
 s 15 
 s 16 
  s 26 
 s 27 
 s 79 
 s 80 
 s 81 
 s 82 
 s 83 
 s 84 
 s 85 
 s 86 
 s 88 
 s 150 





National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 
 
Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 
 S 65J 
s 74(1) 
 s 74B 
 s 74E 
 s 74J 
 s 74L 
 s 74P 
 s 74R 
 s 74S 
 s 74U 
 




Table of Cases 
 
AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) 
Balkind V ABSA Bank 2013 (2) SA 481 (ECG) 
Julie Whyte Dresses (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 1970 (3) SA 218 (D) 
London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 (3) SA 591 (D) 
Firstrand Bank v Seyffeerts 2010 (6) SA 429 (GSJ) 
Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 (3) SA 56 (CC) 
SA Taxi Securitization v Mbatha 2011 (1) SA 310 (GSJ) 





Declaration of Candidate 
 
I, Louise Grace Botha, hereby declare that the contents of this dissertation represent my own 
unaided work (except as provided under the normal supervision process) and that the 
dissertation has not previously been submitted for academic examination towards any 
qualification. Furthermore, it represents my own opinions and not necessarily those of the 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Howard College Campus and it does not contain any other 
person’s writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. 
Where other written sources have been quoted, then:  
1. the words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been 
referenced; and  




















ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ANC African National Congress 
MFRC Micro Finance Regulatory Council 
NCA National Credit Act 
NCR National Credit Regulator 






Access to credit is very important as it allows consumers to buy goods that they cannot 
necessarily buy with one month’s salary.  Having access to credit also allows consumers to 
start small businesses.  This not only benefits individual consumers, access to credit also 
helps the economy of a country to grow.  However, due to the history of South Africa, many 
poor consumers were not able to access the formal credit sector as they did not have the 
necessary security to obtain credit.  Many poor consumers had to use the informal credit 
sector or ‘mashonisa’ (informal money lenders) where they were open to abuse by credit 
providers who did not care about the law.    At this point in time the credit industry was 
regulated by the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 and the Usury Act 73 of 1968 which had 
certain requirements which made access to credit for poor consumers difficult.  The South 
African government tried to make access to credit easier for poor consumers by introducing 
two Exemption Notices.  However, an unintended consequence of this was that credit 
providers were able to offer many small loans to one consumer at very high interest rates.  
Levels of over-indebtedness then increased to the point where the government became very 
concerned about the situation both for consumers and for the economy as a whole.  After an 
in depth study by the Department of Trade and Industry, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(NCA) was enacted.  The NCA was specifically introduced to stop reckless lending by 
creditors and to prevent consumers from becoming over-indebted.  When the Act came into 
operation it was very difficult for consumers to obtain loans.  This was because of the 
onerous penalties provided for in the Act and because the Act established the National Credit 
Regulator (NCR) and the National Consumer Tribunal (NCT).  These two bodies were 
established to ensure that credit providers, debt counsellors and credit bureaux were 
complying with the Act.  The NCR investigates allegations of non-compliance with the Act 
and refers matters to the NCT for a hearing.  If credit providers are found to be contravening 
the Act the Tribunal can impose heavy administrative fines or they can deregistered the credit 
provider.  However, after a period of time, it seems that credit providers discovered that the 
Act was not being enforced properly and so it became easier for consumers to obtain loans.  
This has created a situation where over-indebtedness is still on the increase.  It also shows 
that the mechanisms put in place by the NCA have not worked and more and more consumers 
are becoming over-indebted.  This has caused the government to relook at the NCA and it has 
introduced amendments to the NCA.  By introducing the new regulations the government 




indebtedness. However, whether these amendments will achieve this will ultimately depend 
on how the NCR and the NCT are able to enforce them.  If they cannot enforce the NCA 
properly then credit providers might just continue to offer loans to consumers who cannot pay 





CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
On 16 August 2014, the South African Police Service opened fire on a crowd of striking 
mineworkers at Marikana, about 100km northwest of Johannesburg in the North West 
Province.1  This horrific event led to the death of 34 mineworkers. 78 mineworkers were 
wounded and 259 people were arrested.2  The unrest at the Lonmin platinum mine began on 
10 August 2012 when more than 3000 workers downed tools in what was called an illegal 
strike.3  The protesting mineworkers were demanding a wage increase. The mineworkers 
were looking for a “living wage” of R12 500 per month.4   It is believed that high levels of 
credit may have contributed to the factors that led to the tragic day in Lonmin.5   
 
Newspaper reports dealing with this tragedy suggest that these mine workers were very 
dependent on short term loans from micro lenders.  These short term loans appear to be the 
reason why so many mine workers were over-indebted and so were demanding a substantial 
increase in their earnings. The National Credit Act6 (NCA) defines short-term credit 
transactions as those in which the deferred amount does not exceed R8000 and the whole 
amount is repayable within a period not exceeding six months.7  Mineworkers could access 
loans of up to 50% of the value of their net pay.8  It seems that all the miners needed to 
provide a credit grantor in order to obtain a loan was a payslip showing the previous month’s 
salary and the unsecured credit was granted.9 These short-term credit transactions are 
intended to be once off transactions and therefore they are a very expensive form of credit.10  
In accordance with the regulations to the NCA a maximum of R1257.50 in interest and fees 
                                                          
1
 “Marikana Massacre” www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-August-2012 (accessed 3 July 








 Lisa Steyn, “Marikana miners in debt sinkhole” Mail and Guardian Online 7 Sept 2012 mg.co.za/article/2012-
09-07-00-marikana-miners-in-debt-sinkhole (accessed 7 July 2014).  
6
 34 of 2005. Hereinafter referred to as the NCA.  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the NCA in this 
paper are references to the National Credit Act. 
7
 Section 39(2)(a) of the NCA. 
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can be charged on a short term loan of R1000.11  This is big business for the micro lenders as 
well as the banks who actively market these unsecured loans.12  
 
Many of the mineworkers who take these short-term loans will often repay their debt at the 
end of a particular month and then they will take out another loan immediately or they will 
repay their loan at the end of the month and then take another loan one or two weeks later.13 
Some of these mineworkers take out two to three loans every month.14  The fact that they are 
taking out so many loans, and on such a regular basis, suggests that these mineworkers have 
become very dependent on these loans and therefore they are probably over indebted.  It also 
seems that it is very easy for them to access these short term loans.  
 
The tragedy of what happened at Marikana and the subsequent news reports which suggested 
that part of the problem was the over-indebtedness of the mine workers leads to the following 
question:  how could it be that South Africans were so over-indebted that they were rioting 
six years after the introduction of the NCA which was specifically introduced to stop reckless 
lending by creditor providers and to prevent consumers from becoming over-indebted?  What 
went wrong and what, if anything, is being done to rectify the situation or prevent such a 
situation from occurring again?   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Before the NCA was enacted, the credit industry was regulated by the Credit Agreements 
Act15 and the Usury Act.16 The only debt remedies available to over-indebted consumers 
were sequestration and being place under administration, which left a huge portion of over-
indebted consumers without an adequate remedy.17  These remedies were inadequate to assist 
the vast majority of consumers because over-indebted consumers either had to show that 




 Angelique Arde, “What to know before you borrow” IOL 29 July 2012 www.iol.co.za/business/personal-
finance/what-to-know-before you borrow-1.1350997#.VDzMf7DlfKO (accessed 1 October 2014). 
13




 Act 75 of 1980. 
16
 Act 73 of 1968. 
17
 Mareesa Kreuser, “The application of section 85 of the National Credit Act in an application for summary 




there was an advantage to their creditors in order to have their estate sequestrated or they had 
to have total debts of under R50 000 if they wanted to be placed under administration.   
 
One of the reasons why the NCA was introduced was to assist over-indebted consumers.  An 
important aim of the NCA is to prevent reckless lending in the first place so that consumers 
do not become over-indebted.  However, situations can arise where consumers who were not 
over-indebted at the time they borrowed the money become over-indebted because something 
happens. For example, they lose their job, become ill and cannot work or they get divorced. 
They are then in the unfortunate position where they cannot repay their debts. The NCA 
provides a mechanism to assist consumers who become over-indebted by introducing a debt 
review process.18   
 
Despite provisions to prevent reckless lending and over-indebtedness which were introduced 
by the NCA, the problem of over-indebted consumers appears to have actually become worse 
since the enactment of the NCA six years ago.19 Anecdotal evidence suggests that more 
consumers are becoming over-indebted and many are defaulting on their credit agreements.20  
This suggests that the mechanisms which were introduced by the NCA have not worked. 
 
It is suggested that one of the main reasons why the mechanisms introduced by the NCA have 
failed to adequately address the problems is because credit providers do not complete proper 
affordability assessments of the financial status of their clients before granting them credit.  
Up until now credit providers have been entitled to choose their own affordability criteria 
when assessing their clients.  This is evidenced in a final report prepared for the National 
Credit Regulator (NCR) entitled “Research on the Increase of Unsecured Personal Loans in 
South Africa’s Credit Market.”21 This report looked at the procedures followed by a number 
of credit providers.  It was found that the affordability tests used by credit providers varied.  
                                                          
18
 Section 86 of the NCA. 
19
 Stafford Thomas, “Cover Story 1 – Consumer Debt.” Financial Mail 2 April 2012 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/fm/2011/10/27/cover-story-1---consumer-debt (accessed 15 September 
2014). 
20
 NCR Annual Report 2012/13 http://www.ncr.org.za/Annual%20Report/ebook/12-
13/book_image/NCR_ANNUAL_REPORT_PRINT.pdf (accessed 15 September 2014). 
21
“Research on the Increase of Unsecured Personal Loans in South Africa’s Credit Market” 6 August 2012 




There has been no clear procedure that all credit providers had to adhere to and therefore 
consumers have been at risk of becoming over indebted. 
 
 This has now changed with the introduction of the new regulations.22  The introduction of 
these amendments met with a great deal of opposition from credit providers.23  The new 
regulations propose that before any credit provider can be registered in South Africa, they 
have to comply with a code of conduct or guidelines prescribed by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry or the NCR.24 The Banking Association of South African was opposed to this idea 
and wanted the credit providers’ code of conduct to be drawn up by credit providers and then 
approved by the Minister or the NCR.25  Wonga, a micro lender which provides loans based 
on an assessment conducted over the internet, also opposed the provision for a prescribed 
affordability assessment arguing that it will have a negative impact on their business model.26  
Wonga explained that their online loan decisions are fully automated and do not rely on 
manual submissions.27  The new affordability assessment would mean that Wonga would 
have to change the way in which they conduct their business and for this reason they were 
opposed to the introduction of more stringent measures.  
 
Another issue which appears to have contributed to the problems of over-indebtedness in 
South Africa relates to the enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of the NCA by the NCR and 
the National Consumer Tribunal (NCT). A perusal of the judgments on the website of the 
NCT28 reveals that there are very few judgments which deal with credit providers which have 
granted credit recklessly. Granting credit recklessly constitutes prohibited conduct under the 
                                                          
22
 GN 590 of GG37882, 01/08/2014; 3. 
23
 Linda Ensor, “Changes to National Credit Act in Pipeline”4 February 2013 
www.bdlive.co.za/business/retail/2013/02/04/changes-to-national-credit-act-in-pipeline (accessed 15 
September 2014). 
24
 Londiwe Buthelezi “Banks want credit data of former defaulters to stay.” January 30 2104 
www.iol.co.za/business/news/banks-want-credit-data-of-former-defaulters-to-stay-1.1639068#VDzl2rDlfKO 




 Linda Ensor, “Wonga CEO says new credit laws will hit online lenders.” 4 February 2014 
www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2014/02/04/wonga-ceo-says-new-credit-law-will-hit-online-lenders 








NCA29 and such conduct can be referred to the NCT for a hearing.  If a credit provider is 
found to be engaging in reckless credit granting the NCT can impose a penalty on that 
provider of up to 10% of the provider’s annual turnover.30 This could be a substantial penalty 
and therefore it must be assumed that this is a strong deterrent and credit providers would be 
extremely careful before granting credit.  However, there appears to be only one matter 
against African Bank and more specifically it was against one particular branch of African 
Bank.31  African Bank and the NCR reached a settlement in terms of which African Bank had 
to pay an administrative penalty of R20 million.32  In view of the problems experienced by 
the miners at Marikana as well as the report published by the NCR which focuses specifically 
on the fact that unsecured lending in South Africa is on the increase, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the problems of reckless lending go far beyond one branch of African Bank.  
Therefore it also seems reasonable to assume that the lack of any reports relating to cases 
taken to the NCT by the NCR is a sign that the NCR is not enforcing the NCA to the extent 
that was envisaged by the legislature when the NCA was introduced.   
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This research involves a critical analysis of the NCA with particular reference to the issue of 
reckless credit lending and the over indebtedness of consumers.  In this regard a number of 
questions are raised: 
• Why was there a need for the legislature to introduce the NCA? 
• How does the NCA define over-indebtedness? 
• What new provisions did the NCA introduce to help consumers who were over-
indebted? 
• What new remedy did consumers have when dealing with debt? 
• Have the new provisions helped the situation of over-indebtedness in South Africa? 
• Why was there a need to amend the NCA? 
                                                          
29
 Section 1 of the NCA defines prohibited conduct as any act or omission in contravention of the NCA or that 
constitutes an offence under this NCA by an unregistered person who is required to be registered to engage in 
such act or a credit provider, credit bereau or debt counsellor. 
30
 Section 161 of the NCA. 
31
 Lisa Steyn, “African Bank to pay R20m after reaching NCR agreement.” Mail and Gaurdian Online 04 October 







• What new measures has the legislature introduced with the National Credit 
Amendment Act? 
• Will these measures resolve the problems of reckless credit lending and over 
indebtedness? 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research for this paper is desk based.  It is based on an analysis of decided cases and 
legislation.  This dissertation will also refer to articles which have documented the problems 
which over-indebted consumer are facing and the problem of reckless lending in South 
Africa.  In addition, this dissertation will refer to published articles by leading South African 
academics which discuss the measures that have been put in place by the NCA and whether 
those measures have been successful in resolving the issues they were designed to deal with.  
Finally this dissertation will discuss the recent amendments to the NCA. 
 
1.5 Overview of Chapters 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 1 provides an introductory 
background to this dissertation.  Chapter 2 deals with the history of credit in South Africa as 
well as the remedies that were available to consumers before the NCA was introduced. 
Chapter 3 deals with the NCA and the enforcement thereof as well as the new provisions 
which deal with over-indebtedness, reckless lending and debt review.  Chapter 4 introduces 
the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 and will discuss those provisions which 






CHAPTER 2  
HISTORY OF CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 The importance of access to credit. 
In a cash economy or a society structured on barter only, there would be no need for credit.33  
Credit transactions are necessary when a person cannot or chooses not to pay cash for a 
product or service. Credit allows consumers to have access to and to use a product or a 
service before they have fully paid for the product or service.34 However, in order to have 
access to credit, consumers will usually pay a fee which is usually in the form of interest.  
Credit allows consumers to purchase items that they cannot afford from a single month’s 
salary because they are able to spread the payments over a number of months.35 Not many 
consumers can afford to pay cash for expensive items such as houses or motor vehicles.36  
For the vast majority of South Africans the same is true when it comes to buying smaller 
items such as a fridge or a television or trading stock for a small business.37  Some consumers 
even use credit to pay for their consumables such as clothing, food and travelling expenses.38  
The Department of Trade and Industry, when it considered the need to reform South African 
credit law identified the benefits of a working credit industry within an economy because 
access to credit helps consumers to accumulate assets, exploit economic opportunities and 
establish businesses.39  
 
As pointed out above, having access to credit allows consumers to purchase products or 
services that they would not be able to purchase if they could only rely on a single month’s 
income.40  The credit industry, especially when it came to micro lenders, was rife with the 
                                                          
33
 “Making Credit Markets Work, A policy Framework for Consumer Credit” 






 Kelly Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 6. 
37
 “Making Credit Markets Work, A policy Framework for Consumer Credit” 
www.ncr.org.za/publications/Background_NCA_docs/Credit Law Review.pdf (accessed 17 August 2014). 
38
 Kelly Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 6. 
39
 “Making Credit Markets Work, A policy Framework for Consumer Credit” 






exploitation of consumers, questionable lending and ruthless lending practises.41 In the credit 
industry there is often a huge imbalance of power between consumers and credit providers.42  
Consumers are often poorly informed and uneducated about their rights or they are unable to 
enforce their rights through either negotiation or legal action.43  Deceptive marketing 
practises and weak disclosure regarding the consequences of entering into a credit 
transactions (such as the cost of credit through the addition of interest and fees) could cause 
consumers to enter into credit transactions that they cannot afford.44  This could lead to 
financial hardship which would see consumers taking on extra loans in order to pay back 
existing loans, causing a debt spiral which is difficult to escape.45  This leads to many 
consumers becoming over-indebted.  Over-indebtedness has a negative impact not only on 
families but also in the workplace as it can lead to de-motivation, absenteeism and even a 
propensity to commit theft.46  
 
It is important to note that the problem of over-indebtedness is not only a problem for the 
individual consumer, it is also a problem for society at large.  An example of this would be 
the tragic events that unfolded in Marikana.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large number 
of mineworkers have ended up being over-indebted due to the many unsecured loans that 
have been made available to them.47  This then led to dangerously high levels of anger, 
resentment and feelings of having been betrayed by the leadership in the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the formal trade unions.  It was the high levels of debt and the need for 
increased wages to meet these debts which caused the miners to strike and ultimately ended 
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2.2 Credit Legislation prior to the National Credit Act 
Before the NCA was introduced, consumer credit legislation consisted mainly of the Credit 
Agreements Act,49 the Usury Act50 and the Exemption Notices of 1992 and 1999.  As these 
were important forerunners to the National Credit Act, they will each be discussed in turn. 
 
2.2.1 The Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
The Credit Agreements Act was enacted to provide for the regulation of certain transactions 
in terms of which movable goods were purchased or leased on credit or certain services were 
rendered on credit.51  This Act did not apply to money lending transactions.52  This Act 
applied when a consumer bought or leased movable goods such as a motor vehicle or a fridge 
on credit.  Section 6(5) of this Act required the consumer to pay an initial payment or deposit 
in order for the credit agreement to become binding on the parties.  The underlying 
philosophy of the deposit requirement was that only consumers who were able to pay the 
prescribed deposits should be allowed to buy or lease the goods on credit.53  For example, in 
order for a consumer to buy a fridge for R10 000 he would have to come up with the 
prescribed deposit of R1000. If he could not come up with the deposit then he would either 
have to buy a cheaper fridge or simply go without.  The requirement of having to pay a 
deposit was thus clearly aimed at preventing a person from purchasing something he could 
not afford and therefore was aimed at preventing over-indebtedness.54  
 
The Credit Agreement Act further tried to prevent over-indebtedness by not allowing a 
person to be party to a credit agreement in terms of which the period within which the full 
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price was payable, exceeded an appropriate prescribed period.55  Using the above example of 
the consumer wanting a fridge for R10 000, he would need the deposit of R1000 and the 
consumer would have to pay the fridge off in twenty four months.  The prescribed maximum 
periods of payment helped prevent consumers from being bound to debts for an extended 
period of indebtedness. From this discussion it can be seen that the purpose behind the Credit 
Agreements Act was to ensure that consumers only bought goods and services which they 
could reasonably afford and they were only bound to the debt for a reasonable period of time.  
So for example, they were not paying for the television or the fridge for years after the goods 
had stopped working or needed substantial repairs.  
 
2.2.2 The Usury Act 73 of 1968 
The Usury Act 73 of 1968 was enacted to provide for the limitation and disclosure of 
financial charges levied in respect of money lending transactions, credit transactions and 
leasing transactions.56  It restricted the amount of interest which could be charged when a 
consumer borrowed money.  The Usury Act covered money lending transactions of up to 
R500 000 and only capped the interest rates for these loans.57  The Usury Act provided that 
no credit provider could demand or receive finance charges at an annual finance charge rate 
greater than the percentage determined by the Registrar in accordance with the directions of 
the Minister.58  The Usury Act provided that basic disclosures had to be made.  A credit 
provider was required to disclose to a consumer in writing the amount that the consumer was 
to receive, all other charges which formed part of the principal debt, the interest rate being 
charged as well as the finance charges that related to the interest rate and the date upon which 
the debt had to be repaid or the number of instalments in which the principal debt together 
with the finance charges must be paid.59 
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One of the criticisms of the Usury Act was that it was a very complicated piece of legislation 
and there were no penalties for non-compliance.60  Many credit providers used to contravene 
the Usury Act by not disclosing fees to consumers.  This left many consumers in a situation 
where they did not fully understand the cost of the credit.  Many consumers ended up paying 
back far more than just the amount of money that they had received.61 
By limiting the interest rate, consumers were somewhat protected from credit providers 
imposing exhorbitant interest rates and so this was another measure which was designed to 
prevent consumers from becoming over-indebted.  However, this all changed with the 
introduction of the Exemption Notices. 
 
2.2.3 The Exemption Notice 
As seen at the beginning of this chapter access to credit is very important to enable 
consumers to participate fully in the economy.  If consumers cannot access credit they cannot 
buy cars, houses or start small businesses.  Due to South Africa’s history and prior to the first 
exemption notice, the majority of the South African population did not have access to the 
formal credit market.62 Many consumers could not provide the necessary security and so 
found it extremely difficult to obtain loans in the formal sector.63 This then meant that many 
consumers who needed credit had to use the unregulated credit market or “the mashonisa”.  
Mashonisas are individuals or entities that provide credit to consumers who cannot get credit 
from the formal credit market.  Because these credit providers and mashonisas were 
unregulated they conducted business as they pleased and many consumers suffered from their 
exploitative practices.64  The government wanted to change this and therefore it introduced 
the first Exemption Notice in the hope that the formal credit market would be persuaded to 
grant credit to poor and disadvantaged people in South Africa.65  This would enable these 
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people to have access to credit in the formal credit sector and would enable them to set up 
small businesses. 
 
In 1992 the first Exemption Notice was issued in terms of section 15A of the Usury Act.  
Section 15A of the Usury Act made it possible for categories of moneylenders to be 
exempted from its provisions. The Minister of Trade and Industry was empowered to 
determine the categories of moneylenders that could be exempt from the Act as well as the 
conditions which applied to an exemption.66  The Exemption Notice was issued because it 
was seen that potential borrowers, who were poor and could not provide the necessary 
security for repayment found it difficult to get loans under the Usury Act.67  It emerged that 
credit providers were reluctant to give loans to these consumers as they believed that the risk 
of non-payment was so high that lending money to them could not be justified.68  Some credit 
providers suggested that it might become commercially viable for them to advance loans to 
these consumers if it were possible for them to charge higher interest rates.69  It would then 
become economically viable to take the risk of lending to high risk borrowers.   
 
In terms of this first notice, loans under R6000 were exempted from the provisions of the 
Usury Act. Interest rates that could be charged on these loans were uncapped.70  This meant 
that lenders could ask for any interest rate that they wanted.71  The micro finance industry had 
been made legitimate and it began to grow very quickly.72 The up-side of this was that many 
poor consumers now had access to loans but these were subject to very high interest rates.73  
 
Unfortunately, there were also some unintended consequences resulting from the introduction 
of the Exemption Notice.  The government introduced the Exemption Notice to encourage 
credit providers to make small loans available to people so that they could do things like set 
up a small business.  But in reality what happened is that many of the furniture and goods 
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stores actually became credit providers or associated themselves with credit providers.74  This 
meant that these credit providers could sell goods like expensive televisions without the 
consumer having to put down a deposit as required by the Credit Agreements Act. The credit 
provider would offer the consumer an expensive loan in order for the consumer to buy what 
he wanted.   
 
Another unintended consequences resulting from the introduction of the Exemption Notice 
was that credit providers which were able to make exorbitant profits and were subject to very 
little control.75  Because there was very little regulation in this industry, consumers were open 
to abuse at the hands of the credit providers.  Credit providers would offer the same consumer 
several loans of R6 000 or less, so they advanced large amounts of money at very high rates 
of interest outside of the Usury Act.76  This contributed to consumers becoming over-
indebted which meant that there was a strong possibility that they would default on their 
repayments. 77  In order to combat the risk of default, credit providers often employed 
extreme money-collecting procedures.78  Credit providers would obtain and hold consumers’ 
bank cards and ID books.  This would enable them to draw a monthly amount from the 
consumer’s bank accounts in order to service their loans.79 This also meant that consumers 
became very dependent on micro loans.  When credit providers took their repayments this 
often left consumers with no money for their normal living expenses and so they had to return 
to the credit provider for further loans.  Because a particular credit provider had their identity 
book and their cash card they were forced to return to the same money lender over and over 
again.  This then led to a vicious never ending cycle of debt.80 
 
This abuse led to the Minister of Trade and Industry consulting with role-players concerning 
the best way in which the micro-lending industry could be regulated in order to provide 
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protection for poor consumers.81  The result of this consultation was the introduction of the 
second Exemption Notice in June 1999.82  The second Exemption Notice repealed and 
replaced the First Exemption Notice.83  In terms of this notice, loans of up to R10 000 were 
now exempted from the provisions of the Usury Act.84 The new notice introduced certain 
controls which were designed to protect consumers.  The repayment period on these loans 
was not allowed to exceed 36 months and the loan amount was not paid in terms of a credit 
card or an overdraft.85  Under the second Exemption Notice if a micro lender wanted to 
qualify for an exemption from the Usury Act, they had to register with the Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council (MFRC).86  Under the second Exemption Notice registered micro lenders 
had to provide limited disclosures to consumers and were penalised in the event of non-
compliance.87  The second Exemption Notice further abolished the practise of micro lenders 
retaining consumers’ bank cards and identity books as a means of ensuring that they had 
access to consumers’ bank accounts and could thereby easily collect their money.88 This also 
meant that consumers were obliged to return to the same micro lender in order to get further 
loans.  In other words consumers could not ‘shop around’ to see whether they could get a 
better deal from other lenders. 
 
The second Exemption Notice tried to regulate the micro-lending industry however, it was 
limited as the MFRC only had control over those lenders which had registered with it.89  If a 
micro lender was not registered with the MFRC, they were supposed to abide by the Usury 
Act and could only charge interest rates as set out in that Act.  However, it seems that this 
was not effectively enforced as many micro lenders continued to operate without being 
registered.  
 
2.3 Debt Relief Measures prior to the NCA 
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Before the enactment of the NCA, there were very few debt relief measures which consumers 
could rely on.  Over-indebted consumers could either have their estate sequestrated or they 
could apply to have their estates placed under administration.   
 
2.3.1 Insolvency 
Sequestration procedures are provided for in the Insolvency Act.90  Sequestration applications 
can be brought by a debtor on an ex parte basis through voluntary surrender, or by way of 
compulsory sequestration in an application with prior notice by a creditor.91  A sequestration 
application must be made in the High Court by way of a motion that must comply with the 
relevant requirements of the Insolvency Act.92   
 
In terms of the Insolvency Act, the court has a discretion to accept the voluntary surrender of 
a debtor’s estate and grant the sequestration order if it is satisfied that:93 
• The provisions of section 4  have been complied with;94 
• The estate of the debtor in question is insolvent; 
• The debtor owns property of a sufficient value to cover the costs of the sequestration 
which will be payable from the free residue of his estate; 
• And it will be to the advantage to the creditors of the debtor if his estate is 
sequestrated. 
 
In the case of a compulsory sequestration the court has the discretion to grant the 
sequestration order if it is satisfied that: 
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• The applicant is a creditor who has a liquidated claim against the debtor for not less 
than R100 or two or more creditors who have a liquidated claims against the debtor 
amounting to not less than R200;95 
• The debtor has committed an act of insolvency;96 
• There is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor if 
his estate is sequestrated;97 and 
• The formalities of section 9 of the Insolvency Act have been complied with. 
 
In the case of a voluntary sequestration the onus of proving that the requirements have been 
met rests with the debtor.98  But in the case of a compulsory sequestration the onus of 
satisfying the court that the requirements have been met rests on the sequestrating creditor 
and there is no onus on the debtor to disprove any element.99  It must be noted that even if a 
court is satisfied that the abovementioned requirements have been established, it does not 
have to grant an order of voluntary sequestration or compulsory sequestration.100  Each case 
must be decided on its own facts and in each case the court has an overriding discretion that 
must be exercised judicially and upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances.101  
The court usually uses its discretion when it looks at the advantages to creditors 
requirement.102 
 
From the above discussion it can be seen that that the requirement of “advantage to creditors” 
plays an important role in whether the court will decide to grant or decline an order for 
voluntary or compulsory sequestration even where all the other requirements have been 
satisfied.103  When determining such an advantage the courts need to look at the whether a 
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substantial portion of the creditors will derive an advantage from sequestration.104  If, after all 
the costs of sequestration have been met and there is little or no funds available to pay 
creditors, there will be no advantage to creditors for the debtor to be declared insolvent.105  
The courts will then refuse to grant the sequestration order.   
 
Should the court grant the sequestration order the consumer may obtain much needed debt 
relief.  The consumer’s goods are sold and creditors are paid what they are owed from the 
proceeds.  According to the Insolvency Act creditors are entitled to 20-25 cents for each rand 
that they are owed.106  One of the main advantages of being declared insolvent is that after 4 
years insolvent consumers can apply for rehabilitation.  The effect of rehabilitation is that the 
sequestration is terminated and all the pre-sequestration debts are discharged, giving 
consumers a fresh start.107  Consumers would no longer be indebted to their creditors and can 
now become functioning members of society again.  
 
Because the courts have a discretion to grant or decline a sequestration order, over-indebted 
consumers have very limited options when it came to debt relief remedies.  If consumers 
cannot show that there is an advantage to creditors courts will probably not grant a 
sequestration order.  In the case of London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair108 it was stated that 
sequestration is only to the advantage of creditors if it will result in creditors as a body being 
paid and there will be no advantage to creditors if no dividend or only a negligible dividend is 
available after the costs of sequestration have been paid.  This means that for an over-
indebted consumer to take advantage of being sequestrated he is going to have to have some 
assets that can be sold and the proceeds used to pay the creditors.  However, most poor 
consumers have become over indebted because they have been borrowing money to pay for 
their normal living expenses such as food, clothing and simple household appliances (which 
are still being paid off). Many of these consumers do not have sufficient assets to ensure that 
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when the assets are sold there will be a significant dividend for the creditors.109  This means 
that sequestration is not an option for most consumers.  The problem then is that over-
indebted consumers will not be able to enjoy the benefits of being rehabilitated and must 
continue to live under their mountain of debt for an indefinite period of time.  In some 
instances the situation is so bad that consumers will spend the rest of their lives in debt.110 
 
This left over-indebted consumers with the option of having their estate placed under 
administration.  However, because of the requirements of administration most consumers 
were left without this option and were at the mercy of credit providers.  
 
2.3.2 Administration 
A second form of debt relief for over-indebted consumers was for their estate to be placed 
under administration.  Administration orders are governed by Section 74 and 74A to 74W of 
the Magistrate’s Court Act.111 
 
 A debtor may apply to court on a prescribed form for his estate to be placed under 
administration if the debtor has a total amount of debt that does not exceed R50 000 and that 
debtor is unable to pay all his debt.112  An administration order makes provision for the 
payment of debts in instalments or otherwise and the administration of the debtor’s estate.113  
When an administration order is granted, the court appoints an administrator who must lodge 
security unless the court appoints a person who is an advocate, attorney, articled clerk or a 
law agent.114  At the hearing the debtor may be interrogated by the court or any creditor 
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whose debt has been proved about his financial position.115  The debtor will be interrogated 
with regards to: 
• His assets and liabilities; 
• His present and future income and that of his wife leaving him; 
• His standard of living and the possibility of economising; and 
• Any other matter that the court may deem relevant.116 
The court then decides how much the debtor should pay the administrator and an order is 
made for this amount to be deducted from the salary of the debtor and to be paid to the 
administrator.117 The administrator must collect the payments made in terms of the 
Administration Order and keep a list of all payments and other funds received on behalf of 
the debtor.118  The administrator may, before making a distribution, deduct necessary 
expenses and a remuneration determined in accordance with the prescribed tariff.119  The 
administrator may also deduct a prescribed amount to provide for future costs.120  The 
administrator must distribute the balance after deductions pro rata among the creditors at least 
once every three months, unless all the creditors otherwise agree or the court orders 
otherwise.121  The distribution account must be lodged with the court where it is open for 
inspection by the debtor and creditors.122  As long as the administration order is in place, 
creditors cannot enforce their claims against the debtor.123  However, the granting of an 
administration order is no bar to the sequestration of the debtor’s estate.124  A debtor who is 
the subject of an administration order commits an offence if he incurs any debts without 
disclosing the administration order.125  As soon as the costs of the administration and the 
listed creditors have been paid in full the administrator must lodge a certificate to that effect 
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with the clerk of the court and send the copies of the certificate to all the creditors.126  When 
this has been done the administration order comes to an end. 
 
On paper this appears to be a satisfactory system for resolving debt problems provided the 
amount of debt is less than R50 000.  However, history has demonstrated that the system is 
open to abuse, especially by administrators.  The Magistrate’s Court Act provides for 
administrators to take a maximum fee of 12.5 percent of the amounts collected.  However, 
copies of distribution accounts reveal that administrators are charging fees of about 23 to 50 
percent of the amounts they collect.127  In 2002 the Banking Council commissioned Deloitte, 
Ernst and Young and KPMG to audit 20 large debt administration companies. This audit 
revealed that the costs, fees and recoveries made by administrators exceeded the maximum 
prescribed limits and allowed administrators to be the major beneficiaries of the process at 
the expense of the debtors and the creditors.128  It was clear that the administration of poor 
peoples’ estates had become big business for some administrators.  This was a system which 
was designed to assist poor people to deal with their debt problems but instead it had become 
a system for certain people to make a lot of money.   
 
Another problem with Administration Orders is that the court hearing the application for 
administration has the discretion to appoint any person as the administrator.129  This means 
that unsuitable people could be appointed as administrators.130 There is no regulatory body 
regulating administrators and administrators do not need to have any type of qualification.131   
 
A further criticism of this system of debt relief is that if a debtor’s total debt exceeds R50 000 
then that debtor cannot apply to have his estate put under administration.  Such debtors are 
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then left without an adequate form of debt relief.132  But, on the other hand, those debtors that 
do have their estates placed under administration, could be caught up in administration 
indefinitely because payments do not cover the costs of administration and the interest which 
must be paid on outstanding debts.133   
 
 
2.3.3 Emolument Attachment Orders 
An emoluments attachment order, which is often referred to (incorrectly) as a garnishee 
order, is not really a debt relief measure.  However it is a measure by which creditors can 
ensure that they get paid.  The fact that creditors can rely on emoluments attachment orders in 
order to ensure that they get paid might be an incentive for creditors to lend money.  This is 
exacerbated by the fact that creditors seem to be able to access payrolls quite easily.  
 
An emoluments attachment order is made in terms of section 65J of the Magistrate’s Court 
Act.134  It allows the creditor to receive weekly or monthly instalments from the debtor 
through a process of monthly deductions made from the debtor’s salary by the debtor’s 
employer before the debtor receives his salary.135  These deductions are paid directly to the 
creditor or a party representing the creditor.136  An emoluments attachment order is used by 
creditors where judgment for a debt has been granted in their favour and the debtor has failed 
to pay that judgment.137  Creditors use this method of collection as it is both time and cost 
effective.138   
 
The process for obtaining an emoluments attachment order is set out in section 65J.  Creditors 
can ask for an emoluments attachment order to be issued from the court where the employer 
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of the debtor resides, carries on business or is employed.
139
  However, research has 
established that emolument attachment orders are often granted in courts established in areas 
in which the debtor neither works nor resides.
140
  This creates a problem for debtors as they 
are unable to oppose or rescind such orders.
141
  This is especially true for poor consumers 
who will not have the funds to travel to other areas to oppose such applications. 
 
An emolument attachment order can be granted in three instances.  The first is in terms of 
Section 65J (2)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act which states: 
 
“An emoluments attachment order shall not be issued –  
(a) Unless the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing or the court has so 
authorised, whether on application to the court or otherwise, and such authorisation 
has not been suspended.” 
 
In terms of this section an emoluments attachment order can be issued where the debtor has 
consented to the order in writing.
142
  This section is open to abuse as there have been some 
instances where the consents have been forged.
143
  Further, where the debtor has consented to 
the emolument attachment order it is often found that the debtor does not understand the full 
costs and obligations of this agreement.
144
  In some cases debtors sometimes propose 
unrealistic instalments that they cannot keep up with.
145
  In some instances creditors will 
ensure that consumers sign such consents at the time that they apply for the loan.  Such 
consents are signed in blank and are used the moment that the consumer defaults.  In a recent 
case before the NCT involving an application for deregistration of a micro lender it was 
found that the micro lender had concluded supplementary agreements with consumers where 
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consumers were made to sign blank acknowledgement of debt forms which allowed the 
micro lender to enforce the credit agreement at its own discretion.
146
  This is a clear violation 
of the NCA and the credit provider was deregistered. 
 
The second instance where an emolument attachment order can be issued is where the debtor 
is notified in terms of section 65(A)(1) to appear in court in order for an enquiry into their 
financial position can take place.
147
  The court can make an order for the debtor to make 




The third instance when an emoluments attachment order can be granted is where a request is 
made directly to the clerk of the court.  Section 65(J)(2)(b) states that an emoluments 
attachment order shall not be issued -  
 
(b) Unless the judgment creditor or his or her attorney has first –  
(i) Sent a registered letter to the judgment debtor at his or her last known address 
advising him or her of the amount of the judgment debt and costs as yet 
unpaid and warning him or her that an emolument attachment order will be 
issued if the said amount is not paid within ten days of the date on which that 
registered letter was posted; and 
(ii) Filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit or affirmation by the judgment 
creditor or a certificate by his or her attorneys setting forth the amount of the 
judgment debt at the date of the order laying down the specific instalments, the 
costs, if any, which have accumulated since that date, the payments received 
since that date and the balance owing and declaring that the provisions of 
subparagraph (i) have been complied with on the date specified therein.” 
 
This section is used by the judgment creditor where the debtor has not consented to the 
granting of the judgment or the court has not authorised the emolument attachment order.
149
  
A letter must be sent by registered mail to the debtor from the creditor advising him of the 
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judgment amount and warning him that an emolument attachment order will be issued if he 
fails to pay his debt.
150
  Then the creditor must file an affidavit confirming that he has sent 





An emolument attachment order is prepared by the creditor or his attorney and it must be 
signed by the judgment creditor or his attorney and the clerk of the court, and served on the 
garnishee by the messenger of the court.
152
  The emolument attachment order does not need 
to be served on the debtor.
153
  Sometimes a debtor does not even know about the emolument 
attachment order until they receive their payslip and see the deduction for the first time. 
 
In the third instance there is no enquiry into the financial affairs of the debtor and the creditor 
then decides on the instalment amount.
154
  Further, the creditor and the clerk of the court 
granting the emolument attachment order do not know if the debtor has other existing 
emolument attachment orders.
155
  This could result in a debtor taking home very little salary 
at the end of every month.  Newspaper reports regarding the Marikana tragedy indicated that 
in some instances consumers were taking home as little as R2000 to R3000 per month.
156
   
 
In South Africa it is common for one debtor to have multiple emolument attachment 
orders.
157
   This means that debtors who are probably over-indebted and were defaulting on 
existing debt were given unsecured credit when they really could not afford it.  This could be 






 S65J(3) of the Magistrates Court Act. 
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an indication of reckless credit lending on the part of credit grantors.
158
  From this 
information it can also be deduced that emolument attachment orders are being used as a 





The Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act tried to protect consumers from over-
indebtedness.  The government found, however, that some consumers, especially poorer 
consumers, were being excluded from the formal credit market.  This was because credit 
providers were not willing to grant credit due to the restrictions placed on them by the Usury 
Act and the Credit Agreements Act.  This then led to the introduction of the Exemption 
Notices, exempting smaller loans from the Usury Act in the hopes that the formal banking 
sector would be encouraged to make small loans available to poor consumers.  This meant 
that the protection that was in place to prevent over-indebtedness was now removed.  The end 
result of this was that the level of over-indebtedness in South Africa reached alarming 
proportions.   
 
It also became clear that the debt relief remedies available to consumers were not adequate to 
assist consumers.  The government further realised that helping consumers to overcome their 
debt problem is important because once they have paid off their debt or been relieved of their 
debt problems, they are able to become functioning members of society again.   
 
The increase in over-indebtedness and the inadequate debt relief measure which were 
available to assist consumers led to the enactment of the National Credit Act. 
  








CHAPTER 3  
THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 
 
3.1 Rationale Behind the introduction of the National Credit Act  
As seen in chapter 2, the credit industry was regulated by two rather complicated pieces of 
legislation with very inadequate remedies to assist over-indebted consumers.  The legislation 
was also very outdated as the consumer credit market in South Africa was changing rapidly 
and there was an increase in over indebted consumers.
160
  These factors led to the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s decision to review the legislation and evaluate the problems facing 
consumers in the credit market.
161
 During the review process, extensive research was 
conducted by the Micro Finance Regulatory Council which focussed on the consumer-credit 
market. 
 
Many weaknesses in the consumer credit market were identified.  The weaknesses which are 
particularly relevant to this discussion were as follows:  
• Inappropriate debt-collection and personal insolvency legislation that created an 









This extensive review by the Department of Trade and Industry resulted in the promulgation 
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3.2 The Purpose of the National Credit Act 
The NCA was promulgated to create a single system of credit regulation in South Africa and 
to establish the NCR whose responsibility it is to administer the credit industry.
165
  The 
purposes of the NCA are set out in Section 3 of the Act. These include promoting and 
advancing the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promoting a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient and accessible credit market and industry and 
protecting consumers.  The Act does this by: 
 
• Promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, 








• Promoting responsibility in the credit market by encouraging responsible borrowing, 
the avoidance of over-indebtedness and the fulfilment of financial obligations by 
consumers and discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and 
contractual default by consumers.
168
 
•  Promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers.
169
 








• Addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by 
the consumer of all responsible financial obligations.
172
 
                                                          
165
 Kelly Louw Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012). 
166
 Section 3(a). 
167
 Section 3(b). 
168
 Section 3(c)(i)-(ii). 
169
 Section 3(d). 
170
 Section 3(e). 
171
 Section 3(f). 
172













From this it can be seen that the purpose of the Act is to ensure that all South Africans, 
including previously disadvantaged persons have access to credit but that it is also important 
that the market functions effectively and that those who borrow money are in a position to 
repay their debts.  There have been numerous cases where the courts have discussed the 
purposes of the Act.
175
  The courts have said that the main purposes of the Act are to promote 
and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry, and to protect consumers.
176
  In the case of Kubyana v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd, a decision of the Constitutional Court, the court went further to say that the Act 
also seeks to promote a competitive, sustainable, efficient and effective credit industry by 
promoting responsibility in the credit market, encouraging responsible borrowing, 
discouraging contractual default and adhering to a debt-enforcement system that prioritises 
the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer’s obligations under credit agreements.
177
 
Thus, there needs to be a balance between protecting the consumer’s rights with the rights of 
the creditors. 
 
3.2 Important Sections of the National Credit Act. 
One of the main aims of the Act is to ensure that consumers do not become over-indebted.  
One way to ensure this was to introduce the reckless lending provisions.  This now means 
that creditors must ensure that consumers can afford to repay their loans before they can grant 
them credit.  If  credit providers fail to take steps to ensure that consumers were not over-
indebted they are engaging in reckless lending which, in terms of the Act, has certain serious 
negative consequences for credit providers.  This is designed to stop credit providers from 
granting credit to those who cannot afford it.  The Act further introduced new debt relief 
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measures for consumers who due to circumstances, sometimes beyond their control, cannot 
honour their present credit obligations.      
 
3.2.1 Over-indebtedness 
A consumer is over-indebted in terms of the Act if he or she is or will not be able to satisfy in 
a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which he or she is a 
party.
178
  The determination whether the consumer is over-indebted or not, is done on the 
preponderance of information available at the time of the determination.
179
  The person 
making this determination must take into consideration the financial means, prospects and 
obligations of the consumer
180
 and probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the 
obligations under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as shown by the 




It must be noted that at the time of taking out a particular debt such as buying a motor vehicle 
or a house or even certain household goods, the consumer may well be able to afford the 
debt.  However a life event may occur which changes this position.  For example, the 
consumer may be retrenched or otherwise lose his job,
182
 or he may get divorced or the 
breadwinner or one of the breadwinners in the family may die.  The result may be the loss of 
income and a consumer who could previously meet his debts quite comfortably, is now in a 
position where he cannot repay those debts.   
 
3.3.2 Reckless Lending Provisions 
The National Credit Act introduced the concept of reckless credit lending and provides 
certain serious consequences for credit grantors who engage in reckless lending.  Section 
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80(3) of the NCA provides that a credit provider must not enter into a reckless credit 
agreement with a prospective consumer. 
 
The NCA provides that a credit agreement is reckless if, at the time that the agreement was 
made the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by the National Credit 
Act.
183
 It is important to note that regardless of whether the credit provider believes a 
consumer can repay the debt, they are obliged to conduct the assessment.  Failure to conduct 
the assessment on its own constitutes reckless lending even if, had the assessment been done, 
the credit provider would have granted the credit.   An agreement can also be declared 
reckless if the credit provider, having conducted an assessment, entered into the agreement 
with the consumer despite the fact that on the information available to the credit provider 
indicated that the consumer did not understand or appreciate the risks, costs or obligations 
under the proposed credit agreement
184
 or entering into that credit agreement would make the 
consumer over-indebted.
185
   
 
When a consumer applies for credit and while the credit application is being considered by 
the credit provider, the consumer must fully and truthfully answer any requests for 
information made by the credit provider as part of the assessment required by the National 
Credit Act.
186
  A credit provider must not enter into a credit agreement without first taking 
reasonable steps to assess the consumer's:
187
 
• General understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit, 
and of the rights and obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement;
188
 
• Debt repayment history as a consumer under credit agreements;189 
• Existing financial means, prospects and obligations.190 
 
                                                          
183
 Section 80(1)(a). 
184
 Section 80(1)(b)(i). 
185
 Section 80(1)(b)(ii). 
186
 Section 81(1). 
187
 Section 81(2)(a). 
188
 Section 80(2)(i). 
189
 Section 80(2)(ii). 
190




If a consumer alleges that a credit agreement is reckless there is a complete defence open to 
the creditor.  It is a complete defence to the allegation that a credit agreement is reckless if 
the credit provider can show that the consumer failed to fully and truthfully answer any 
requests for information made by the credit provider as part of the required assessment
191
 and 
a court or the Tribunal decides that the consumers failure to do so materially affected the 




When the Act was first introduced, it provided that a credit provider could determine for 
themselves their own criteria for meeting their assessment obligations, provided that such 
criteria resulted in a fair and objective assessment.
193
  This meant that the test for whether a 
credit provider had taken the required reasonable steps should have been determined 
objectively looking at the facts and circumstances of each case.
194
  The Act also provided that 
the NCR could pre-approve the criteria that creditor providers could use when conducting the 
assessments as required by the NCA. 
195
 However, these guidelines were not binding on 
credit providers.
196
  It is important to note that the NCR did not pre-approve any criteria set 
by any credit provider even though the Act permitted this.  So up until this point in time each 
creditor has been able to set their own standards and questions.  This then leads to the 
question of how it would be possible to find that there has been reckless lending because, 
provided there has been even relatively superficial compliance with the Act, creditors would 
have been able to argue that they did comply, therefore, they could argue there has been no 
reckless lending.  
 
A recent case which demonstrates the problem is illustrated by what has come to be known as 
the R699 matter.  This matter involved a company called Satinsky which is a motor 
dealership.
197
  Satinsky offered to sell motor vehicles to consumers who could obtain finance 
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from major South African banks.  Their monthly repayments would be subsidised through 
advertising contracts with a Hong Kong based company known as Blue Lakes Trading and 
Promotions.
198
  The vehicles would essentially be turned into driving advertisements for the 
scheme. In terms of these arrangements, consumers could effectively drive new cars from as 
little as R699 per month, depending on the contract signed.
199
  Basically consumers had two 
contracts.  The first contract was with the bank which financed the vehicle.  In terms of this 
contract, consumers were liable for the full instalment of the vehicle.  Consumer then had a 
second contract with Blue Lakes in terms of which they would receive payment for 
advertising.  The advertising deal with Blue Lakes collapsed and consumers no longer 
received the advertising fee.  This now meant that the consumers now had to pay the full 
instalment to the bank without the subsidy from Blue Lakes.  This put many consumers into 
financial difficulty as many could not afford the full vehicle instalment without the 
advertising fee. 
 
The three major banks involved in this matter are Absa Bank Limited, Nedbank Limited and 
Standard Bank Limited.  Wesbank was the only bank which refused to finance these vehicles 
from Satinsky saying that the deal was unsustainable and too risky.
200
   In this matter the 
banks involved all confirmed that the affordability assessments were done according to the 
lending framework of the NCA.
201
  Absa has stated that they provided credit in line with their 
processes and criteria and was never party to the contract between the consumer and Blue 
Lakes.
202
  So the question that needs to be asked is: if these consumers cannot afford the 
vehicle instalment without the advertising fee and the banks insist that they did not take this 
fee into account when assessing the affordability then how did all those consumers qualify for 
a loan they clearly cannot afford to service?
203
  This seems to be a clear example of 
superficial compliance with the Act but certainly there appears to be no compliance with 
what the Act was hoping to achieve. 
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A finding that a credit agreement constitutes reckless lending has many adverse consequences 
for the credit provider.
204
  The NCA empowers the courts to suspend credit agreements.  In 
any court proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered, a court may declare 
that the credit agreement is reckless.
205
  If a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless 
then the court may make an order setting aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and 
obligations under that agreement
206
 or the court may make an order suspending the force and 
effect of that credit agreement.
207
  If a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless then it 
must consider whether the consumer is over-indebted at the time of those court 
proceedings
208
 and if the court concludes that the consumer is over-indebted the court may 
make an order
209
 suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement until a date 
determined by the court when making the order of suspension
210
 and restructure the 
consumer’s under any other agreements in accordance with section 87.
211
  Before making an 
order in terms of section 3, the court must consider the consumer’s current means and ability 
to pay the consumer’s current financial obligations that existed at the time the agreement was 
made
212
 and the expected date when such obligation under a credit agreement will be 





During the period that the force and effect of a credit agreement is suspended the consumer is 
not required to make any payment under the agreement.
214
  The creditor is not allowed to 
charge interest or any other fee to the consumer.
215
  The creditor’s right under the agreement 
are unenforceable.
216
  After the suspension of the force and effect of a credit agreement ends 
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all the respective rights and obligations of the credit provider and the consumer under that 
agreement are revived
217
 and fully enforceable to the extent that a court may order.
218
   
 
Despite the powers given to the courts in cases of reckless lending, reckless lending cases are 
rare. In April 2010, a Port Elizabeth Magistrate found Absa Bank guilty of reckless lending 
after the bank granted a pensioner a loan in circumstances where the monthly instalments he 
was expected to pay were in excess of his monthly income.
219
  The consumer approached a 
debt counsellor, who in turn referred the application to an attorney with the end result that the 
court found in favour of the consumer.
220
  In another matter, a Johannesburg magistrate found 
that African Bank was guilty of reckless lending because African Bank failed to adequately 




In order for a court to make a finding of reckless lending consumers need to go to debt 
counsellors who will then be able to determine if there was reckless lending and take the 
matter to court.  These applications are time consuming and costly and some debt counsellors 
do not have the funds to go to court. In most instances consumers will not have the funds to 
approach courts either.  The costs involved may mean that from a practical perspective 
consumers are without an effective remedy to have a credit agreement declared reckless.  
 
Reckless lending is regarded as prohibited conduct in terms of the Act and so credit providers 
who engage in such lending could face an investigation by the NCR and the matter could be 
referred to the NCT for a hearing.  A finding of reckless credit lending could lead to the 
imposition of an administrative penalty
222
 which could be as high as 10% of the provider’s 
annual turnover.  This should be a major deterrent for credit providers. However, as pointed 
out in Chapter 1 there appears to be only one case involving one branch of African Bank 
where such as case has been dealt with by the Tribunal.  
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3.3.3 Debt Review 
Debt review is a new remedy available to debtors who are over-indebted.  This is the primary 
relief for over-indebted consumers.
223
  Debt review can be initiated either under section 85 or 




Section 85 of the National Credit Act states that in any court proceedings in which a credit 
agreement is being considered, if it is alleged that the consumer under the credit agreement is 
over-indebted, then the court may refer the matter directly to a debt counsellor with a request 
that the debt counsellor evaluate the consumer’s circumstances and make 
recommendations
225




The second way for debt review to be initiated is where a consumer applies to a debt 
counsellor to have himself declared over-indebted.
227
  However, debt review will not apply to 
a particular credit agreement if, at the time of the application, the credit provider under the 
credit agreement has proceeded to take steps as set out in section 129 of this Act.
228
  A debt 
counsellor must then determine, after looking at the finances of the consumer, whether a 
consumer appears to be over-indebted
229
 and if the consumer is seeking a declaration of 




Once an assessment on the consumer is conducted the debt counsellor may conclude that: 
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• The consumer is not over-indebted and must therefore reject the application, even if 
the debt counsellor concluded that a particular credit agreement was reckless.
231
 
• The consumer is not over-indebted but is likely to experience difficulty satisfying all 
the consumer’s obligations under the credit agreements.  The debt counsellor may 




• The consumer is over-indebted and then the debt counsellor may issue a proposal 




The court may order that one or more of the consumer’s credit agreements be declared to be 
reckless
234
 or that one or more of the consumer’s obligations be re-arranged by the debt 
counsellor.
235
  However, as already been discussed above, not all debt counsellors have the 
means to take an application alleging that there has been reckless lending to court. 
 
In terms of section 88 of the NCA a consumer who has filed for an application in terms of 
section 86 or who alleges in court that they are over indebted must not enter into any further 
credit agreements or incur any further charges with a credit facility until 




• The court has determined that the consumer is not over-indebted or the court rejects 
a debt counsellor’s proposal.
237
 
• The court makes an order on the consumer and credit providers where an agreement 
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When a consumer is placed under debt review the debt counsellor will help draft a budget for 
the consumer that will help the consumer to manage his monthly finances better.  The debt 
counsellor will also negotiate a suitable payment arrangement with the credit providers.  By 
reducing the monthly instalment amount the consumer will, it is hoped, be able to get through 
the month on his salary.  While under debt review the consumer will only have to make one 
payment to a Payment Distribution Agency and it in turn will pay the creditors.  Once the 
debt has been repaid, the consumer’s credit record will be wiped clean which will allow the 
consumer to apply for credit again.  This process is supposed to be simple and to help over-
indebted consumers escape from their crushing debts.  However, an independent study has 




While under debt review, consumers are not allowed to enter into any credit agreements.  
This is an attempt by the legislature to protect over-indebted consumers from incurring more 
debt.  If a credit provider enters into a credit agreement with a consumer who has applied for 
debt review then all or part of the new credit agreement may be declared reckless in terms of 
the NCA.
240
  However, it seems that it may well be that many consumers do not apply for 




If a consumer goes under debt review, they may end up paying more interest on a debt 
because the period of time for repayment is extended.  Credit providers are under no 
obligation to reduce the interest rate on the debt.  This means that when consumers are under 
debt review for a long time, the interest might be more than the payment made each month.  
It must be noted however that the consumer will not be paying interest for an indefinite time 
because the interest is capped due to the in duplum rule.  The common law in duplum rule is 
where the interest on a debt will no longer continue to run where the total amount of arrear 
interest has accrued to an amount equal to the outstanding principal debt.
242
  The NCA 
incorporates a statutory version of the in duplum rule which is similar to the common law 
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rule however, the statutory rule includes a number of costs such as collection costs, service 
fees, etc in addition to interest which in aggregate may not exceed the unpaid principal debt 
at any point while the consumer is in default under the credit agreement whereas the common 




3.4 Enforcement of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
The National Credit Act established the National Credit Regulator and the National 
Consumer Tribunal in order for the National Credit Act to be enforced and monitored. 
 
3.4.1 National Credit Regulator 
The National Credit Regulator (NCR) was established as the regulator in terms of section 12 
of the NCA and is responsible for the regulation of the South African Credit industry.  The 
NCR: 
• Has jurisdiction throughout the Republic;244 
• Is a juristic person;245 
• Is independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law;246 
• Must exercise its function in accordance with the NCA;247 
• Must be impartial ;248 and 
• Must perform its functions in as transparent a manner as is appropriate having 
regards to the nature of the specific function;
249
 and 
• Must perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.250 
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Each organ of state must assist the NCR to maintain its independence and impartiality, and to 
perform its function effectively.
251
 The responsibilities of the NCR are set out in sections 12 
to 18 of the NCA. 
 
The NCR is responsible to promote and support the development of a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry to serve the needs of historically disadvantaged persons; low income persons and 
communities; and remote, isolated or low density populations and communities with the 
purposes of the NCR.
252
  The NCR needs to monitor and report the following to the Minister 
on an annual basis: 
• Credit availability, price and market conditions, conduct and trends;253 
• Market share, market conduct and competition within the consumer credit industry, 
the credit industry structure, including the extent of ownership, control and 
participation within industry by historically disadvantaged persons;
254
 
• Access to consumer credit by small business or persons;255 




• And any other matter relating to the credit industry.257 
 
The NCR regulates the consumer credit industry by registering credit providers, credit 
bureaux and debt counsellors.
258
  Credit providers, credit bureaux and debt counsellors may 
not conduct their business without registering with the NCR.
259
  The NCR can also suspend 
or cancel any registration in terms of the NCA.
260
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One of the most important responsibilities of the NCR is the enforcement of the NCA.  The 
NCR must enforce the NCA by: 
 
• Promoting informal resolution of disputes arising in terms of the NCA between 
consumers on the one hand and a credit provider on the other;
261 
• Receiving complaints concerning alleged contraventions of the NCA but not 
intervening in or adjudication any such dispute;
262 
• Monitoring the consumer credit market and industry to ensure that prohibited conduct 
is prevented, detected and prosecuted;
263 
• Investigating and ensuring the national and provincial registrants comply with the 
NCA and their respective registrations;
264 
• Issuing and enforcing compliance notices;265 
• Investigating and evaluating alleged contraventions of the NCA;266 
• Negotiating and concluding undertakings and consent orders in terms of the NCA;267 
• Referring to the Competition Commission any concerns regarding market share, anti-
competitive behaviour or conduct that may be prohibited in terms of the Competition 
Act 89 of 1998.
268
 
• Referring matters to the NCT and appearing before the NCT;269 and 
• Dealing with any other matter referred to it by the NCT.270 
 
The NCR is also responsible for increasing knowledge about how the consumer credit market 
operates in South Africa and for promoting public awareness of consumer credit matters.
271
  
The NCR is expected to do this by implementing education and information measures to 
develop public awareness.
272
  The NCR is also expected to provide guidance to the credit 
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market by issuing explanatory notices outlining its procedures, or its non-binding opinion on 
the interpretation of any provision of the NCA or applying to court for a declaratory order on 
the interpretation or application of any provision of the NCA.
273
  The NCR is required to 
monitor the socio-economic patterns of consumer credit activity and to identify factors 





  These are fairly onerous but important duties which have been placed on the 
NCR and it is hoped that it will be properly resourced to implement them.  There is little 
evidence at this stage that the NCR is meeting all these obligations but it is perhaps too early 
in the life of the NCR to make a proper judgment on this issue.  However the NCR has been 
criticised for failing to regulate credit providers which engage in reckless credit lending.   
 
3.4.2 National Consumer Tribunal 
The National Consumer Tribunal (NCT) was established in terms of section 26 of the NCA.  
The NCT is a juristic person which has jurisdiction throughout the Republic of South Africa 
and is a tribunal of record that must exercise its function in accordance with this Act or and 
other applicable legislation.
276
  The NCT or a member of the NCT acting in accordance with 
the NCA may adjudicate in relation to any:
277
 
• Application that may be made to it in terms of the NCA and may make any order 
provided for in the NCA in respect of such application;
278
 
• Allegation of prohibited conduct by determining whether prohibited conduct has 




The Tribunal may grant an order for costs in terms of section 147 and exercise any power 
conferred on it by law.
280
  A decision by the Tribunal has the same status as one made by the 
High Court of South Africa.
281
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The primary responsibility of the NCT is to deal with credit providers who engage in conduct 
that is prohibited by the NCA.  The NCR investigates the conduct of the credit providers and 
then refers the matter to the NCT for a hearing into the possible prohibited conduct.  If the 
NCT finds that a credit provider has been engaging in prohibited conduct it has a number of 
penalties which it can impose.  The NCT can suspend or cancel a credit provider’s 
registration
282
 or have the credit provider repay the consumer any excess amount charged as 
well as excess interest set out in the credit agreement.
283
  The NCT can impose an 
administration penalty as a form of punishment for the credit provider who is seen to be 
contravening the NCA.
284
  In terms of section 151 of the NCA the NCT may not exceed the 
greater of 10 percent of the credit provider’s annual turnover or R 1 000 000.  These are very 
severe penalties that credit providers can face if they are found contravening the NCA.  
Government hoped that this would deter credit providers from engaging in prohibited 
conduct.  However, it seems that the NCR and the NCT have failed in enforcing the NCA 
properly as credit providers continue to freely offer credit and consumers are becoming more 




One of the reasons why the NCA was introduced was because of the high level of over-
indebtedness which existed in South Africa and the inadequate debt relief measures that were 
available for consumers.  The NCA defined over-indebtedness and introduced important 
provisions to prevent the granting of credit recklessly.  If creditor providers are found to have 
engaged in reckless lending then there are heavy consequences for those credit providers.  
Credit agreements could be set aside by the courts and credit providers could be penalised by 
the NCT.  However, after six years there have not been many cases brought before the courts 
of reckless lending and even fewer cases of prohibited conduct involving reckless lending 
before the Tribunal.  There has been no empirical study as to why this is the case and 
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therefore it is only possible to make certain assumptions. The lack of cases before the court 
could be due to the fact that these cases are time consuming and costly for consumers to bring 
to court. 
 
Another reason could be that credit providers have been superficially complying with the 
NCA.  Credit providers have been allowed to set their own criteria for affordability 
assessments.  It is suggested that this has enabled credit providers to conduct very superficial 
assessments and so they have continued to grant credit to already over-indebted consumers.  
Should consumers raise the issue of reckless lending at a later stage credit providers are able 
to show that an affordability assessment was done in terms of the NCA. There has been no 
uniformity amongst the credit providers when it comes to the affordability assessments.  This 
in itself creates uncertainty and consumers do not know what is required of them. 
 
The NCA introduced a further debt relief measure in the form of debt review.  This was now 
an option for consumers who in the past were unable to have their estate sequestrated or to 
apply for administration.  By going under debt review consumers are unable to get further 
credit.  This was a way to protect over-indebted consumers and prevent further over-
indebtedness. 
 
The NCA was enacted six years ago and yet there are still very high levels of over-
indebtedness in South Africa.  In fact anecdotal evidence suggests that indebtedness in South 
Africa is increasing, not decreasing as was expected after the introduction of the Act.  Credit 
providers still seem to be engaging in reckless lending.  It seems that credit providers have 
not been deterred from engaging in reckless credit lending.  This has now led to the 
government conducting a further investigation into debt problems in South Africa and has led 
to the introduction of the National Credit Amendment Act.
285
 It is hoped that these 
amendments will close the loopholes which have been found to exist in the NCA.  
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The National Credit Amendment Act 
 
4.1 Rationale for the Amendments 
Government recognises that access to credit is critical for household consumption 
expenditure and economic growth, however government continues to be concerned about the 
very high levels of household debt in South Africa and the over-indebtedness of 
consumers.
286
  In June 2013 the level of household indebtedness had risen to 76 percent of 
disposable income and many households had fallen into arrears or defaulted in terms of their 
credit agreements..
287
  It was believed that reckless lending and the abuses in payday loans 
had aggravated this problem and that such abusive practices were driving many over-indebted 




In June 2012 the Department of Trade and Industry embarked on a comprehensive review of 
the policy framework regarding consumer credit with the purpose of analysing and amending 
the current policy.
289
  Loopholes were identified in the NCA and the National Credit 
Amendment Act has now been introduced in an attempt to close some of those loopholes.
290
  
Some of the policy challenges identified were that the NCR’s powers had to be strengthened; 
reckless lending practises had to stop and each credit provider had to do a proper affordability 
assessment before granting credit.
291
 The Amendment Act has been signed by the President 
but will only come into operation on a date to be announced.  At present, the regulations are 
in the process of being finalised.  Further the President must state the date for the 
commencement of this Act. 
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“ National Credit Amendment Bill [B47B-2013: briefing by Department of Trade and Industry” 
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The National Amendment Act changes the governance structures within the NCR, it provides 
for the registration of payment distributions agents and tightens measures relating to debt 
counsellors and the conduct of their practises.
292
  The National Amendment Act will also 
provide a standardised affordability assessment for creditors which will aid in the prevention 
of reckless lending.   
 
4.2 Important Provisions of the National Credit Amendment Act. 
There have been many amendments to the NCA but for the purposes of this dissertation only 
the provisions relating to the affordability assessments and the functions of the NCR will be 
discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Registration of credit providers 
Section 42, which deals with those entities which are required to be registered with the NCR, 
has been amended.  Until the amendments, the NCA only required credit providers with at 
least 100 credit agreements or a total principal debt of R500 000 to be registered credit 
providers.
293
  This amendment removed both requirements and now the Minister will 
determine the threshold amount for the purposes of determining whether a credit provider is 
required to be registered.
294
  This amendment is to ensure that all creditor providers are 
registered with the NCR.  This means that the NCR will now be responsible for ensuring that 
all credit providers are acting within the NCA and the NCR will now be able to investigate all 
credit providers when there is an allegation of that credit provider contravening the NCA.  
This amendment will substantially increase the workload of the NCR.  Government is going 
to have to review the NCR in order to ensure that it can handle this increase in the workload.  
Government needs to be cautious as it seems that the NCR had a substantial workload before 
the amendments and it seems that it struggled to ensure proper enforcement of the NCA. The 
Regulator has struggled to regulate credit providers that have fallen under its jurisdiction up 
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until now – how is it going to cope with these increased regulatory functions?  A lack of 
enforcement will enable credit providers to continue to get away with prohibited conduct 
because the NCR does not have the resources to enforce the NCA.    This amendment further 
opens questions about businesses that provide incidental credit.
295
  Will they now need to 
register with the NCR?  This will need to be clarified when the Minister publishes the new 
threshold levels. 
 
4.2.2 Affordability assessments 
As has been discussed above, currently, creditors are allowed to develop their own 
affordability assessment criteria. It seems that this has been a major contributor to the 
continued problems of over-indebtedness and reckless lending and has allowed credit 
providers to argue that they are complying with the Act even when this is superficial 
compliance. The Act has now been amended and with this amendment the Minister is 
empowered to prescribe affordability assessment regulations which creditors will have to use 
when conducting their affordability tests.  Failure to adhere to these regulations could see 
creditors being held for reckless lending.  
 
On 1 August 2014, the Minister published draft National Credit Regulations.  Chapter 3 of 
the Regulations deal with the criteria to conduct affordability assessments.  These regulations 
apply to consumers, all credit providers and all credit agreements that fall under the NCA.
296
  
A credit provider must take practicable steps to assess the consumer’s allocatable income as 
well as their discretionary income to determine whether the consumer has the financial means 
to pay the proposed credit instalments.
297
  A credit provider is required to take practicable 
steps to validate the consumers income by referring to the consumers recent three months’ 
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payslips, the consumers three month bank statements or any other similar credible 
information.
298
  This means that credit providers would need to see a consumers’ payslip and 
bank statement before granting credit.  Online credit providers such as Wonga are concerned 
that this will negatively affect business as it will require consumers to have equipment such 
as scanners to send through the required documentation resulting in a longer turnaround time 
and reducing their access to short term credit.
299
  The argument is that this will force 
desperate consumers to again turn to the informal credit markets or mashonisas.  However, 
given the problems which have been experienced in South Africa and the failure to have a 
more standardised system of information gathering, these requirements should be welcomed.   
 
The Regulations also contains a comprehensive list of questions that credit providers will be 
required to ask consumers before an affordability assessment is regarded as having been 
conducted properly.  When conducting the affordability assessment, a credit provider must 
calculate the consumer’s allocatable and discretionary income, take into account all of the 
consumer’s debts as well as any maintenance obligations arising from statutory deductions or 
necessary expense.
300
  Allocatable income is defined as gross income less statutory 
deductions such as income tax, unemployment insurance and maintenance payments, less 
necessary expenses.
301
  Necessary expenses means the consumer’s minimum living expenses 
as determined in accordance with the regulations together with any other necessary living 
expenses excluding debt repayments.
302
  Discretionary income is defined as gross income less 
statutory deductions such as income tax, unemployment find, maintenance payments and less 
necessary expenses; less all other committed payment obligations including such as appear 
from the credit applicant’s credit records as held by any Credit Bereau which income is the 




By standardising the affordability assessment criteria the Legislature hopes that this will 
prevent credit providers from providing credit to the maximum of the consumer’s income, 
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leaving the consumer with little income for other things.
304
  Having standard assessment 
criteria also provides credit providers and consumers with clarity as to what is needed before 
credit can be granted.  However, again there is the problem that these requirements will be 
too burdensome and it could lead to consumers being refused credit and create a situation 
where consumers will again resort to using the informal credit market.  This amendment 
needs to be closely monitored by the Department of Trade and Industry.  There is a strong 
possibility that some consumers might not qualify for credit in the formal credit market due 
to the affordability test and they will then seek credit in the informal sector where the credit 
providers do not care about the law.  This might lead to higher levels of over-indebtedness 
and hardship for consumers.  Achieving the correct balance between access to credit and 
preventing over-indebtedness will remain a ongoing challenge and is, it is submitted a task 
which the NCR is called upon to monitor.  
 
4.2.3 The Tribunal to deal with reckless credit lending 
As was discussed above, the Act sets out certain consequences for credit providers that are 
found to have granted credit recklessly.  However, in terms of the NCA only a court can 
make a finding that a provider had granted credit recklessly.  As was pointed out, this could 
have severe financial implications for already over-indebted consumers.
305
  However the 
NCA has now been amended and the amendment will allows the NCT as well as a court to 
declare a credit agreement reckless in accordance with the NCA.
306
  The NCT is now 
provided with all the powers that a court may have in declaring credit agreements to have 
been granted recklessly.   
 
This amendment will assist debt counsellors to bring applications of reckless credit lending to 
the attention of the NCT.  Not all debt counselling firms are large enough to dedicate 
resources to reckless lending investigations and smaller firms have stated that it is impossible 
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for them to bring applications of reckless lending due to time constraints and lack of funds.
307
  
This amendment could be a cheaper alternative to assist over-indebted consumer to have their 
agreements declared reckless.  Further, it might deter credit providers from granting credit 
without conducting proper affordability assessments well knowing that it is now the NCT that 
has the power to declare credit agreements to be reckless.  This may be an amendment that 
will help over-indebted consumers.     
 
4.2.4 Amendment of Section 136 of the NCA 
This section has been amended by allowing any person to submit a complaint concerning an 
alleged contravention of the NCA or a complaint concerning an allegation of reckless credit 
lending to the NCR in the prescribed manner and form.
308
  Current practise at the NCR is that 
credit providers that wish to report unregistered credit providers for illegal practises are not 
being heard and the NCR requires consumers to lay complaints.
309
  Consumers may not 
complain about illegal or reckless lenders as they see them as their last resort to credit.
310
  I 
believe this amendment could be viewed as a way for creditor providers to bring unregistered 
credit providers and illegal practises to the NCR. 
 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
By amending the NCA, the government has tried to close the loopholes and provide the 
necessary relief to over-indebted consumers.  Government has also increased the powers of 
the NCT.  All credit providers will now have to be registered with the NCR.  This means that 
the NCR can monitor and take action against all credit providers that are in contravention of 
the NCA.  Further the NCT now has the power to declare credit agreements to have been 
granted recklessly.  This may act as a deterrent to credit providers and this is a cheaper 
alternative where a consumer can lodge the allegation of reckless lending. 
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Credit providers will have to do a proper affordability assessment in order to see in the 
consumer qualifies for credit.  However, it must be stressed that the NCR needs to exercise 
caution around affordability assessments.  It will defeat one of the important purposes of the 
Act which is to ensure that all South Africans have access to credit and there  cannot be a 
situation where credit providers refuse to grant consumers credit and then those consumers 
resort to the informal credit market – mashonisas- who do not follow the law.  This could 
lead to further over-indebtedness for consumers who, because they are acting outside the 







From this discussion it can be seen that it was necessary to introduce the previously 
mentioned amendments in order to curb over-indebtedness.  Having government set the 
criteria for affordability assessments will mean that both credit providers and consumers now 
know what they are expected to do.  The advantage of this regulation is that now people 
know what to do and this can be monitored and enforced better.   
  
With that being said, at the end of the day, whether or not the NCA achieves the lofty aims 
set out in section 3 is going to boil down to proper enforcement of the NCA by the NCR and 
the NCT.  A major problem with the NCA has been the lack of enforcement.  If there had 
been more cases of reckless lending taken to the NCT and if the NCR had set up proper 
criteria for assessments as provided for in the NCA then these amendments might not have 
been necessary.  As stated above, when the NCA was first introduced it became very difficult 
for consumers to obtain credit.  However, over a period of time credit providers discovered 
that the NCA was not being enforced and so credit providers soon went back to their old 
ways.  The NCA has now been amended so that credit providers and consumers understand 
the issues clearer.  However, the NCA needs to be enforced properly or, it is suggested that, 
credit providers will have no incentive to change their behaviour.  Government needs to 
ensure that the NCR and the NCT have enough resources so that they can enforce the NCA 
properly.  As stated above there is a huge problem in South Africa with informal money 
lenders (known in some communities as mashonisa) who lend money at huge interest rates 
and use very unsavoury methods to ensure that they are repaid.  It seems that they have no 
fear of the law.  This needs to change. 
 
In conclusion, therefore it can be argued that the government needs to find a balance between 
the rights of credit providers and the rights of consumers to have access to credit.  
Government further needs to make sure that the NCR and NCT have the necessary resources 
to enforce the NCA properly.  If the law is too strict when it comes to lending money then 




the Act then the level of over-indebtedness could get worse.  We will then end up with a 
situation which no amendments in law can rectify. 
 
